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Abstract
For advanced airplane, the Safety of Flight tends to be dependent on complex flight control system. The result is a 
greatly increased emphasis on flight control system failure effects. FAR25 airworthiness standards are based on, and
incorporate, the techniques of the fail-safe design concept. Critical FAR25 airworthiness clauses and Special 
Conditions about flight control system failures are analyzed. Airworthiness requirements and methods of compliance 
are studied. Key works in flight control system development are summarized. System safety assessments and failure 
state verification test are conducted for showing the compliance with airworthiness requirements.
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1. Introduction
For advanced airplane, the Safety of Flight tends to be dependent on complex flight control system. 
The result is a greatly increased emphasis on flight control system failure effects. For example, advanced
civil airplane tend to be dependent on complex flight control systems for enhancement of stability, control 
effectiveness, and control feel characteristics over enlarged flight envelopes, and for numerous automatic 
control modes. The result is a greatly increased emphasis on failure effects of flight control system. Key 
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questions are- Which failures and combinations must be demonstrated? And how must they be
demonstrated? Therefore, advanced flight control technology poses a difficult task for the authorities
faced with specifying airworthiness requirements, and for the manufacturers who must comply with and 
anticipate these requirements.
2. Airworthiness Requirements Analysis
The Part 25 airworthiness standards are based on, the techniques of the fail-safe design concept, which
considers the effects of failures and combinations of failures in defining a safe design. The following 
basic objectives pertaining to failures apply[1]:
In any system or subsystem, the failure of any single element, component, or connection during any 
one flight should be assumed, regardless of its probability. Such single failures should not be catastrophic.
Clauses about flight control system in Part 25 incorporate fail-safe design concept. Critical clauses for
flight control system require failure states must be considered in flight control system design.
Existing regulations FAR25 are written essentially for un-augmented airplanes with provision for 
limited ON/OFF augmentation airplane. Modern flight control technology has outpaced existing
regulations FAR 25 [2]. Special Conditions (SC) are made for certification of flight control system.
Fig. 1 Flight control system airworthiness requirements relations
Critical clauses and SC for flight control system in FAR25 are given in Fig.1 [3] ,which are divided 
into six categories:
(a) Flying quality requirements. These requirements include considerations about flying quality under 
flight control system failure states, such as Far25.143 , 25.672 and SC "Electronic Flight Control 
System (EFCS)-Flight characteristics compliance via the Handling Quantities Rating Method 
(HQRM) " .
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(b) Structure requirements. These requirements include considerations about remaining structural
strength under flight control system failure states, such as Far25.629, 25.631 and SC "Interaction 
of systems and structures".
(c) System/subsystem requirements. These requirements include considerations about system or 
subsystem behavior under flight control system failure states, such as Far25.671, 25.672 and 
25.1329 etc.
(d) System general requirement. This requirement is Far25.1309"Equipment, systems, and 
installations", which  is system safety requirement for airborne systems . 
(e) Operating requirements. This requirement is Far25.1529"Instructions for continued airworthiness", 
which is about operating limitation .
FAR 25.671 requires the capability of continued safe flight and landing after any single control system 
failure or after any combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable. From Fig.1, flight 
control system failure states are comprehensively considered in airworthiness requirements for flight 
control system. Most of critical clauses and SC for flight control system are “fail-safe airworthiness 
requirements”. Flying quality, structure strength, flight control system behavior requirements for flight 
control system failures in Far25.671 are included in these “fail-safe airworthiness requirements” . Besides,
Far25.671 itself incorporates FAR 25.1309“Equipment, systems, and installations”[4]. That is, system 
safety analyses must conducted on flight control system.
3. Flight Control System Airworthiness Design
Through the above analysis about flight control system airworthiness regulations, it is obvious that 
the prediction of system failure probabilities and their effects has become a significant factor in 
design and development of aircraft employing advanced flight control systems. Therefore,the key 
works of flight control system airworthiness design are:
Firstly, conduct safety analyses and assessments to prediction system failure probabilities and their 
effects. This extensive process involves identifying all possible single and multiple failures in the flight 
control system and their effects, eliminating all single failures that are hazardous, and establishing that no 
multiple failures in the system having a probability of occurrence greater that 10-9 per flight is hazardous.
For failure states, the meaning of "extremely improbable" is defined in FAR 25.1309, which is the 
clause about system safety assessments. FAA interpretation of the terms "probable," "improbable," and
"extremely improbable" in system safety assessments is shown in the sketch below.
Fig. 2 Frequency of  Occurrence per  flight  hour
Another key work are failure state tests for all failure states which have a probability of occurrence 
greater that 10-9 per flight, such as iron bird testing, human in the loop semi-physical simulation test, 
engineering simulator testing and ground testing, flight test, etc., through failure test verify system safety 
analysis results and compliance of “fail-safe regulations” in Fig1.
4. Engineering Application Study
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In the development of flight control system for a transport aircraft, system safety assessments and 
failure state verification test are conducted to meet “fail-safe regulations” requirements.
4.1. System Safety Assessments
Safety analyses based functional model are carried out in preliminary design phase of the fly-by-wire 
flight control system. The results of Function Hazard Assessment (FHA) of airplane are inputs for this 
work. This work includes developing FHA of flight control system, and analyzing the causes of system 
failure states and failure modes of equipments, building system functional model. Finally, based on 
system functional model, qualitative and quantitative assessments are automatically carried out in 
SIMFIA. An example of flight control system functional model is given in Fig.3.
Fig.3 System safety assessment based on system functional model
4.2. Failure State Verification Test
FAR25.672 defines handling qualities requirements after single failure of flight control system, but is 
used for un-augmented airplanes with provision for limited ON/OFF augmentation airplane. Special 
Condition No. 25-316-SC of A380, Electronic Flight Control System (EFCS)-Flight characteristics 
compliance via the Handling Quantities Rating Method (HQRM), is a Special Condition for flight
characteristics with flight control system failures [5].The Special Condition specify that in lieu of 
compliance with 25.672(c), the HQRM contained in Appendix 7 of AC 25-7A must be used for
evaluation of EFCS configurations resulting from single and multiple failures not shown to be extremely 
improbable[6].
The process in HQRM is consistent with the principles of analysis in FAR 25.1309, provides an 
orderly approach to evaluating handing qualities after failures. The HQRM, minimum acceptable level of 
handling quality, depends upon combinations of three factors: Atmospheric disturbance level,Flight 
envelope,Flight control system failure state probability of occurrence.
According to safety assessment of the flight control system, losing single elevator control function 
jams during cruise is a failure of criticality category III. The pitching control function of remaining 
elevator and stabilizer could overcome the influence of single elevator jam. Aircraft is able to continued 
safe flight and landing to satisfy the Special Condition. Engineering simulator is used to verify handling 
quality and safety analysis results in flight control system design process. The engineering simulator test 
is carried to verify the influence of the flight control system failure on handling quality. The transport 
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aircraft engineering simulator is mainly consist of  four computers, flight deck and data transfer cables as 
in Fig.4.
Fig.4 An transport aircraft engineering simulator structure
A flight task is selected from general handling quality task categories specified in HQRM. The flight 
task with left elevator is jammed at -10 degree. The task is performed to evaluate the maneuvering 
capability after single elevate failure.
Generally, these are maneuvers in which the pilot attempts a significant change in airplane path, speed, 
or attitude in order to evaluate safe airplane capability, but not reflecting the normal daily commercial use 
of the airplane. Most of these maneuvers are representative of engineering airworthiness stability and
control tests.
The pitch axis controller must be sufficiently powerful to produce an adequate range of load factors for
maneuvering. In order to assess the pitch axis controller while the left elevator is jammed at -10 degree, it 
shall be possible to maneuver by use of the pitch control alone. This maneuvering capability is required at 
constant altitude at the 1–g trim speed and, with trim and throttle settings not changed by the crew, over a 
certain range about the trim speed.
Aircraft state is set in the most adverse weight and C.G (centre of gravity) , that is maximum weight 
and forward center of gravity limit. And flight task is carried out in cruise flight phase.
Experiments data such as elevator deflection and pitch rate, load factor is collected. Where, pitch rate 
response reflects stability, load factor response reflects maneuverability.
According to HQRM, handling quality requirement after the failure is “Adequate”.
Thought pilot evaluation for simulation experiment, when the left elevator is jammed at -10 degree, the 
pitch axis controller is still sufficiently powerful to produce an adequate capability for maneuvering,
mission performance needs are satisfied, and specified reduced performance is met, but heightened pilot 
effort and attention are needed. According to FAA definition about flying quality rating, the handling 
quality after the failure is “Adequate”[7], which influent the compliance with the Special Condition.
5. Conclusion
Advanced transport aircraft designs have become increasingly dependent on complex flight control 
systems in order to improve their flight characteristics. The result is a greatly increased emphasis on
failure effects of flight control system.
In this report,“fail-safe regulations” of Flight control system requirements in Part 25 have been
analyzed with regard to their treatment of failure cases. There appears to be common acceptance of the 
fact that flight control system safety assessments and failure experiments are essential for verification of 
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airworthiness requirements. Safety assessments based functional model is carried out, which analyses
system failure probabilities and their effects.
Engineering simulator test is carried out to verify the influence of a flight control system failure
obtained from functional hazard assessment on handling quality. Verification results indicate the 
compliance with airworthiness requirement. 
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